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Public Employees and the Right
To Disobey
By RoBERT G. VAUGHN*
He whom the State appoints must be obeyed to the smallest
matter, be it right - or wrong.
Sophocles, Antigone
Introduction
One employee is ordered to install an illegal wiretap, another im-
properly to award an architectural contract, another to release grant
funds to an unqualified recipient, and another to lower occupational
health and safety standards. Still another employee is ordered to
circumvent Civil Service Commission rules in order to make a patron-
age appointment and to violate personnel regulations by obtaining res-
ignations through harassment. These hypotheticals, suggested by the
investigation of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities,' illustrate why the right of public employees to disobey
illegal or unconstitutional orders is important. This Article examines
the protections available to an employee who refuses to obey an order
that the employee believes is illegal. It then evaluates arguments for
and against judicial recognition of a right to disobey under those cir-
cumstances, explores the proper scope of the right if recognized, and
analyzes the effects of recognition.
Current Status of the Public Employees' Right
to Disobey Orders
Surprisingly few cases2 discuss the circumstances in which an
employee who disobeys an order will be protected from disciplinary
* LL.M., 1970, Harvard University; J.D., 1969, B.A., 1966, University of Okla-
homa. Professor of Law, The American University. The author acknowledges the
assistance of J. Stephen Hatfield in the preparation of this article.
1. See generally Executive Sess. Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Presidential
Campaign Activity of the U.S. Senate, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
2. There are several explanations for the lack of cases on this fundamental
question. First, employees often try to bring disobedience cases under an existing
[261]
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action. 3  In an early case, Roller v. Stoecklein,4 a police officer was
dismissed for insubordination for refusing to obey a departmental order
prohibiting on duty officers from parking their private cars in public
spaces traditionally reserved by custom and policy for businessmen.
In reversing the Civil Service Commission and reinstating the police
officer, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas held that the officer was
justified in disobeying the departmental order because "[t]he duties
of a chief of police do not include the power to adopt regulations for
the use of public streets."5
The court began with the proposition that the police officer was
subject to the lawful and reasonable orders of his superiors but found
that the employee's refusal to obey the order was justified because the
police chief's order was constitutionally infirm on two separate grounds.
First, the court found that promulgating regulations respecting the use
of public ways was legislative, not administrative, in character and
subject to definite limitations. Even if an ordinance had attempted
to delegate the power to issue the order to the police department, the
court would have declared the assignment invalid as an improper dele-
gation of power.0 Therefore, the officer was not required to obey the
order because it was not within his superior's power to give. Second,
the court believed the order violated the equal protection clauses of
the state and federal constitutions by denying constitutional rights to
a few citizens, including the police officer, and thereby conferring
special benefits on others. Thus, the public employee was justified
constitutional protection, such as free speech, rather than risk the uncertainity con-
fronting a plaintiff who asserts a right to disobey. Slocum v. Fire & Police Comm'n,
8 Ill. App. 3d 465, 290 N.E.2d 28 (1972) (order to wear American flag on police
uniform); Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr.
520 (1967) (school teacher ordered to shave beard). These cases closely resemble
some right to disobey cases discussed in this Article. Second, given the psychological
pressures upon persons working in large institutions, extraordinary personal resources
are required to resist authority. See note 123 & accompanying text infra. Third,
informal and nondisciplinary sanctions are extensively used by public officials to ensure
compliance with their orders. See notes 116-26 & accompanying text infra.
3. "Whistle blowing" and public dissent cases are related to the right to disobey
and many times in releasing information about agency conduct a public employee
may be disobeying an order not to release the information. This Article, however,
does not discuss the specific problems of release of information by public employees
or public dissent by public employees. See generally WHISTLE BLowING: THE REPORT
OF THE CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (R. Nader, P. Petkas & K.
Blackwell eds. 1972).
4. 75 Abs. 453, 143 N.E.2d 181 (1957).
5. Id. at 455, 143 N.E.2d at 183.
6. Id.
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in disobeying the order because it was an unreasonable and arbitrary
abridgement of his rights as a citizen.
7
The court specifically rejected the defendant's argument that "it
is unbecoming a police officer to refuse to obey any personal order
issued by a superior under the color of his office, irrespective of the
arbitrary, immoral, or unconstitutional nature of the order."" The
court recognized, however, that in certain situations the refusal to obey
a direct and reasonable order, albeit one with possible legal infirmi-
ties, could be detrimental to the public interest. For example, in an
emergency, unquestioning obedience to orders may be necessaryY
The court concluded that even then "it is possible to conceive of
difficult situations in which moral and legal. considerations prohibit
obedience."10
The case provides little specific insight into the moral or legal
considerations that might justify a refusal to obey an order,'1 but the
opinion does suggest that the reasonableness of the employee's action
7. Id. The court relied on State ex rel. Christian v. Barry, 123 Ohio St. 458,
175 N.E. 855 (1931), for the proposition that "[t]he fact that a citizen is employed
as a police officer does not constitute a waiver of any privilege granted by the con-
stitution." Roller v. Stoecklein, 75 Abs. at 456, 143 N.E.2d at 184. In Barry the
Cleveland Police Department issued a departmental order requiring every member of
the force to obtain permission before settling any civil suit for damages to the personal
automobiles of the officers. Although the order "was issued in a wise and certainly
most commendable effort to eliminate the coercion of private citizens by police officers
in damage cases," 123 Ohio St. at 463, 175 N.E.2d at 857, the court determined that
dismissal of an officer for not consulting with his superior officer before instituting a
suit in violation of the departmental order was improper because it deprived the
officer of his resort.to the courts, a right guaranteed by the state constitution. Id.
See Annot., 74 A.L.R. 500 (1931).
8. 75 Abs. at 456, 143 N.E.2d at 184.
9. The military may be a context in which to tolerate a refusal to obey a direct
order would per se be detrimental to the public interest. See note 69 infra.
10. 75 Abs. at 456, 143 N.E.2d at 184.
11. Discussing conditions that might justify a police officer's refusal to obey a
superioF's order, the court stated: "Should an officer, on orders, inhumanly treat a
prisoner for the purpose of obtaining a confession in violation of the prisoner's con-
stitutional rights? If a superior officer has such authority, supported by the right of
suspension and removal, what other unlawful and unreasonable acts may be imposed
upon a subordinate officer and what other classes of citizens may be similarly denied
their fundamental rights? These are serious considerations of public concern which
are indirectly involved in this case." Id. As cases discussed in the text of this
Article demonstrate, there is no question but that a public employee is justified in
disobeying an ordei that, if carried out, would violate the constitutional rights of a
third person. The more difficult question is under what circumstances moral or ethical
considerations albne, without a clear legal violation, will justify refusal to obey an
order.
must be judged in light of the circumstances of the particular case.
For example, the Roller court notes that, unless time is of the essence
in responding to an order, alternative methods to correct perceived
infirmities in a directive should perhaps be explored, thereby avoiding
immediate resort to disobedience. 12  Unfortunately this language of-
fers only an amorphous and elusive standard against which employees
must gauge their conduct. The courts are presented with a dilemma
in endeavoring to circumscribe the bounds of permissible reasonable
disobedience.
The most illuminating discussion of the circumstances in which a
public employee may rightfully disobey an order is found in a 1967
California Supreme Court opinion, Parrish v. Civil Service Commis-
sion.13 Parrish, a young social worker, was ordered to participate in
a series of unscheduled visits to the homes of recipients of Aid to Needy
Children (ANC) in order to confirm the claimed absence of the male
parent or the presence of unauthorized males. After attending a brief-
ing at which he and other social workers were told of the nature and
objectives of the investigations, Parrish concluded that he could not
in good conscience participate in the program. He discussed his
doubts "in great detail" with his immediate superior, stating, accord-
ing to his superior's testimony, that as a matter of principle he did
not wish to go on the so-called random visits. 14  After a week of dis-
cussions with his immediate superior failed to resolve the matter,
Parrish submitted a written refusal to his division chief, stating that
his unwillingness to participate was based on the premise "that [the
visitations] were degrading, presumed the guilt of recipients, violated
their rights of privacy, were not required under his job classification
and were inconsistent with his training and the rehabilitative goals of
the ANC program."' 5 Parrish was subsequently discharged for in-
subordination. The dismissal was ratified by his superiors, upheld
after a hearing by the Civil Service Commission, and affirmed by the
trial court on Parrish's petition in mandamus for reinstatement.16
On appeal Parrish characterized the mass visitation as a general
exploratory search without valid warrants and argued it violated the
fourth and fourteenth amendments and the California Constitution.
7
12. 75 Abs. at 457, 143 N.E.2d at 184.
13. 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
14. Id. at 275-76, 425 P.2d at 233, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
15. Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 51 Cal. Rptr. 589, 592 (1966), rev'd, 66 Cal.
2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 594.
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Finally, he claimed that his participation in this violation of constitu-
tional rights might subject him to criminal penalties under the Federal
Civil Rights Act.:' The appellate court rejected these arguments on
the ground that the searches were consensual and therefore did not
violate federal or state constitutional rights.19 In considering the
"reasonableness and propriety" of the order, the court stated that the
order was made in the exercise of the county's duty to determine the
continuing eligibility of recipients and that, because all workers in
Parrish's department were asked to participate in the operation, the
request was not unreasonable as to him.
20
The California Supreme Court reversed, upholding Parrish's right
to refuse to participate in the operation. As a threshold determination
the court found that the visits were in fact an unconstitutional violation
of the rights of third parties. The court declared the searches infirm
on the ground that the county did not attempt to limit the searches to
the homes of persons against whom the welfare authorities harbored
any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. The alleged consent was
found to be defective, and the court determined that even if effective
consent had been obtained, the county could not condition the con-
tinued receipt of welfare benefits upon the giving of such consent.
The court identified two additional elements crucial to its decision:
"[tihe information known to plaintiff at the time he made his decision
gave him reasonable grounds to believe that the operation would be
unconstitutional [and] that he did so believe .... ."21 Parrish had
attended a briefing at which he was told about the objectives of the
mass visitation, its timing and scope, and the strategy for carrying out
the operation. Because he was well informed about the scope and
objectives of the operation, he could reasonably have concluded that
it would be unconstitutional. The requirement of reasonable belief
is objective to the extent that an external standard is imposed notwith-
standing the fact that subjective elements inhere as well.
The court noted additionally that Parrish "did so believe."2 2  In
other words, plaintiff's belief that the operation would be unconstitu-
tional was made in good faith.23 The requirement of good faith is
18. Id. at 596.
19. Id. at 594-96.
20. Id. at 596.
21. 66 Cal. 2d at 276, 425 P.2d at 234, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
22. Id.
23. The actual belief language in Parrish, in effect, sets out a good faith standard
because 1) it goes to the subjective state of mind of the individual employee as does
an essentially subjective standard, addressing the state of mind of the
employee. The opinion suggests several factors in determining wheth-
er good faith existed. The plaintiff had discussed his objections with
his immediate superior during the week prior to his dismissal. Unable
to reach any agreement, he submitted a written statement declaring
his unwillingness to participate in the mass visitations and setting forth
the reasons for his decision. The record is noticeably void of any
suggestion that the plaintiff's refusal to participate was grounded in
a personal conflict with his superior or was tendered for any purpose
other than to communicate clearly his intentions with regard to con-
duct be believed improper. This course of conduct evidenced the
plaintiff's good faith in refusing to participate in the operation.
The court expressly declined to consider the effect of its decision
had "any one of these elements been missing."24  By so doing the court
deliberately left open a very important question - whether a public
employee's right to disobey an order that he believes in good faith
and based on reasonable grounds to be unconstitutional depends on a
court's later determination that the order was in fact unconstitutional.
Parrish also justified his refusal to participate by raising his rights
as a government employee. In responding, the court quoted from a
1924 opinion: 25 "Insubordination can be rightfully predicated only
good faith and 2) in evaluating this state of mind it embraces the same statements
and conduct that are evident when good faith is present.
24. 66 Cal. 2d at 276, 425 P.2d at 234, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
25. Garvin v. Chambers, 195 Cal. 212, 232 P. 696 (1924). In Garvin a police
officer who had been indefinitely suspended from the force pending investigation of
alleged violation of the National Prohibition Act refused to speak with the chief of
police unless his attorney could accompany him. The court held that this act did
not amount to insubordination. After formulating a test for insubordination (see note
26 & accompanying text infra) the court stated that although the order of indefinite
suspension was in force, plaintiff's "status as a policeman was suspended to the extent
that he could not be called upon to do police duty nor be held amenable for a failure
to do such duty." 195 Cal. at 224, 232 P. at 701. Thus "he could not be held
amenable for a refusal to comply with a command which concerned not the perform-
ance of police duty, but which . . . clearly contemplated 'putting him on the carpet'
concerning the charge previously instituted against him and for which he was under
suspension." Id.
The Parrish court cited two additional cases in support of the Garvin test for
insubordination. One was Sheehan v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 197 Cal. 70, 239 P.
844 (1925). In Sheehan the San Francisco Board of Police Commissioners, who were
also trustees of the police department's pension fund, determined that plaintiff's dis-
ability had ceased and ordered him to report to the chief of police for active duty.
The court held that the board was without jurisdiction to determine whether plaintiff's
incapacity had ceased and, citing the Garvin test for insubordination, held further
that plaintiff could not be discharged for insubordination for refusal to report for
active duty.
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upon a refusal to obey some order which a superior officer is entitled
to give and entitled to have obeyed."26 The charge of insubordination
against Parrish could not be sustained because the order was not one
which plaintiff's superior officer was entitled to promulgate. The un-
constitutionality of the mass welfare searches in Parrish was the basis
upon which the court found that the order was not one that the welfare
director was entitled to give or one that required obedience.2 7  In the
The second case cited by the Parrish court in support of the Garvin test for in-
subordination was Forstner v. City & County of San Francisco, 243 Cal. App. 2d 625,
52 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1966). The issue in Forstner was whether refusal by a probation
officer to shave his beard on order from the chief probation officer constituted reason-
able cause for dismissal. After citing the Garvin test for insubordination, the court
stated that "such an order must be reasonably related to the duties of the subordinate
officer or employee." Id. at 632, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 625. The charge against the pro-
bation officer was that "your wearing a beard is inimical to your effectiveness as a
Probation Officer in that it tends to indentify you with 'beatnikism' which stands for
attitudes incompatible with your assignment as a Probation Officer." Id. at 627, 52
Cal. Rptr. at 622. On appeal from a superior court writ of mandate restoring the
probation officer's position, the city argued that "they could not present evidence of
the lack of effectiveness of a bearded probation officer because no other probation
officer in San Francisco or elsewhere is known to wear a beard; and that they could
not take the chance of experimenting because of the seriousness of the work entrusted
to respondent." Id. at 633, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 626. Not finding "evidence of extra-
ordinary urgency" the court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support
a charge of insubordination and that, if in fact persons had experienced unfavorable
results by reason of the probation officer's beard, evidence could have been gathered
and produced. Cf. Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58
Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967) (school teacher has liberty interest in wearing beard that is
protected by due process provisions of state and federal constitutions).
26. Garvin v. Chambers, 195 Cal. 212, 224, 232 P. 696, 701 (1924), quoted in
Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 264, 425 P.2d 223, 226, 57 Cal. Rptr.
623, 626 (1967).
The Garvin test for insubordination appears to be generally accepted, Stephens
v. Department of State Police, 271 Or. 390, 394, 532 P.2d 788, 790 (1975); Cunning-
ham v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 48 Haw. 278, 286, 398 P.2d 155, 159 (1964), and seems
comparable to the test for insubordination employed in Roller v. Stoecklein, 75 Abs.
453, 143 N.E.2d 181 (1957).
27. As a practical matter a constitutional question as important as the one in
Parrish probably substantially increased the chances of the public employee's winning
a mandamus action for reinstatement or similar action after discharge for refusing to
obey an order. Thus, as a litigation strategy, the public employee is well advised
to frame his or her reasons for refusing to obey the order as presenting questions of
constitutional stature if at all possible. Compare Forstner v. City & County of San
Francisco, 243 Cal. App. 2d 625, 52 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1966) (public employee dis-
missed for refusal to obey order to shave beard argued that such refusal did not
constitute "reasonable cause" for "dismissal") with Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ.,
250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967) (public employee contested assign-
ment to less desirable position for refusal to shave beard on ground that he had liberty
interest in wearing beard protected by federal and state constitutions). Similarly,
discussion of the general test for insubordination, Justice Tobriner cited
three cases 28 that involved orders that the superior officer did not have
authority to give. 29  One of the three cited cases presented the related
but nevertheless distinct notion that to be lawful an order must "un-
questionably . . . be reasonably related to the duties of the subordi-
nate officer or employee."30 Justice Tobriner did not specifically men-
tion the extent to which the directive was related to the supervisor's
prescribed duties.
The court's analysis leaves open the question whether an employee
is guilty of insubordination if he reasonably believed in good faith
that an order was not valid but the order is eventually held to be one
the superior officer was entitled to give. In a case construing the
Parrish decision, Belmont v. California State Personnel Board,31 an
appellate court rejected the notion of affording protection to public
employees who have refused to obey an order that a court eventually
determines is constitutional and within the superior's authority. In
Belmont, two psychiatric social workers employed by the California
Department of Social Welfare refused to obey a departmental order
to furnish written information about the welfare recipients who were
part of their respective caseloads so that it could be used for electronic
data processing. The order was issued to give effect to an enactment
of the California legislature 32 that called upon the Department of
Social Welfare "to simplify and reduce the cost of welfare administra-
tion by developing efficient, highly automated processes for determin-
ing eligibility in making aid payments." 33  After refusing to comply
with the order, the two social workers were suspended from their em-
although the court in Roller found that the order involved there was also unconstitu-
tional, the court held that the public employee was justified in disobeying the order
because the duties of the superior did not include the power to issue the order in
question. Roller v. Stoecklin, 75 Abs. 453, 455-56, 143 N.E.2d 181, 183 (1957).
28. The test was formulated in Garvin v. Chambers, 195 Cal. 212, 232 P. 696
(1924). The other two cases cited in support of the Garvin test for insubordination
were Sheehan v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 197 Cal. 70, 239 P. 844 (1925) and
Forstner v. City & County of San Francisco, 243 Cal. App. 2d 625, 52 Cal. Rptr. 621
(1966).
29. Sheehan v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 197 Cal. 70, 78, 239 P. 844, 847
(1925); Garvin v. Chambers, 195 Cal. 212, 223-24, 232 P. 696, 701 (1924).
30. Forstner v. City & County of San Francisco, 243 Cal. App. 2d 625, 632, 52
Cal. Rptr. 621, 625 (1966).
31. 36 Cal. App. 3d 518, 111 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1974).
32. Intergovernmental Welfare Management and Information Systems Act of
1969, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11025-11035 (West 1972), repealed 1976.
33. Id. at § 11026.
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ployment for five days for "wilfull disobedience."3 4 Reviews by the
State Personnel Board and superior court upheld the suspension order.3 5
On appeal the two social workers argued that their refusal to
comply with the departmental order was justified because the collec-
tion and storage by government of the type of data they were ordered
to furnish constituted an invasion of the recipients' privacy contrary
to the fourth amendment.3 6  They offered three other arguments in
support of their refusal to obey the order. First, they argued that
"a special professional relationship exists between themselves and
their 'clients' entitling them to assume an adversary position toward
their employer, the State of California, and defend the 'rights of their
clients.' "37 Second, they contended that they owed a higher duty of
allegiance to the social worker's "code of ethics," which was conceived
to protect clients in their contacts with social workers, than to their
employer, the State of California.38  Finally, they argued that the re-
lationship between patient and psychiatric social worker was covered
by the statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege, thereby rendering
the requested information in this instance exempt from compelled
disclosure3 9
The court summarily dismissed these three arguments, stating that
the only issue was whether the department's order was lawful.
4
0
Parrish, the court said, could be relied upon only as "authority for the
proposition that a state employee may properly refuse to obey an
unlawful order . . .41 Because the court found the order lawful,
it affirmed the suspension of the two social workers for willful refusal
to obey a lawful order.42  The court in Belmont relies heavily on the
34. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 521, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 608. That the employees in
Belmont faced a five-day suspension rather than dismissal is one ground for distin-
guishing Belmont from Parrish. Substantively, this distinction should make no differ-
ence. Practically, a court may be less inclined to scrutinize the rationale for a five-
day suspension than for a dismissal.
35. Belmont v. State Personnel Bd., 36 Cal. App. 3d 518, 522, 111 Cal. Rptr.
607, 608 (1974).
36. Id. at 523, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
37. Id. at 522, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
38. Id.
39. Id., see CAL. Evm. CODE § 1014 (West 1966).
40. Regarding the second argument presented by the two social workers, that
compliance with the order conflicted with a social worker's code of ethics, the court
said: "[A]ssuming, arguendo, a conflict between appellants' allegiance to a code of
ethics and their duties as employees of the state, they are legally bound to fulfill the
duties of their employment, or suffer disciplinary action." 36 Cal. App. 3d at 522,
il Cal. Rptr. at 609.
41. Id. at 524, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 610 (emphasis of the court).
42. Id. at 526, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
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premise that it is "essential to the public service that . . . employees
obey all lawful orders given them in the course of their employment.."
43
The court's opinion contains no discussion concerning the reason-
ableness of the belief of the two social workers that compliance with
the order would violate the constitutionally protected interests of their
clients. In addition, the good faith element is mentioned only briefly.
The court said that "a public employee must not himself, in 'good faith'
and without penalty, determine whether such a lawful order shall be
obeyed, for nothing would seem better calculated to 'disrupt or impair
the public service.'"44
Because the three-prong test in Parrish was not stated in the con-
junctive and the court there expressly reserved the question of the legal
consequences of the absence of any one of the factors, the Belmont
court could have extended protection to a disobedient employee who
reasonably and actually believed an ordered act would be illegal when
there was in fact no illegality. The court in Parrish did not place a
premium on actual illegality, thereby elevating it above the other two
factors. The Belmont court's rigidity in viewing the legality of the
order as a threshold issue is not required by the Parrish analysis. 45
This rigid stance can perhaps be explained in part by the conspicuous
absence of a factual basis for a finding of a reasonable and good faith
belief. The opinion includes no description of any behavior by the
employees from which reasonable, good faith belief could be inferred.
The opinion merely states that the employees refused to follow the
order.46  In contrast, in Parrish the social worker discussed at great
length with his superiors his reluctance to obey and explained that his
refusal was based on deep convictions. He also wrote a letter outlin-
ing in great detail the grounds for his decision not to participate in
the random visits. This factual basis supported the court's finding of
the employee's reasonable, good faith belief in the illegality of the
action.
A subsequent case determined that a public employee's refusal
43. Id. at 523, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 609 (emphasis of the court).
44. Id.
45. The question remains an open one with the California Supreme Court. See
Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 233 n.37, 461 P.2d 375, 390, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 175, 190 (1969): "An action taken in defiance of the express orders of school
officials could not, of course, be defended on the ground that the disobedient party
believed in good faith that his judgment surpassed that of his superiors. On the
other hand, a teacher could not be disciplined for refusing to follow an express order
subsequently held to be unconstitutional." [citation omitted].
46. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 521, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
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to obey an order can be predicated upon a violation of a statutory, not
just constitutional, right. In Stephens v. Department of State Police,
47
the Oregon Supreme Court invalidated the discharge of a public em-
ployee who had refused to obey an order to report for work, alleging
that a state statute entitled him to a leave of absence. Stephens, a
trooper in the Oregon State Police and a United States Army reserve
officer, was accepted for a nine-week military training course at an
army infantry school. His request for leave to attend the training
course was denied by the superintendent of the Oregon State Police,
who ordered him to report for regular police duty. Although Stephens
apparently had contemplated resigning to take the Army training
course, he consulted an attorney, who advised him that Oregon law
entitled him to a leave of absence for military training.48 As a result,
he did not report for his state police duties as ordered but left to at-
tend the army infantry school. When Stephens completed his training
three months later and reported for duty, he was told he had been
dismissed. A formal disciplinary proceeding resulted in his removal,
which was confirmed by an Oregon trial court.
49
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, determining
that under Oregon law Stephens was entitled to a leave of absence
for military training but that, nevertheless, under the circumstances he
was guilty of insubordination. Although the court recognized that
"the general rule appears to be that an officer is not insubordinate for
refusing to obey an order that is not legally valid," the court found
that the facts of the case presented an exception to the general rule.50
The majority of the court believed that Stephens had had "ample
time" to anticipate the order to report for police duty, which had ac-
companied the denial of his written request for a leave of absence, and
determined that Stephen should have chosen another course of action.5 1
The opinion does not, however, suggest what that other course of action
might have been.
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, reinstating Stephens as a
state trooper.5 2 The supreme court's brief opinion contains little
analysis of the conditions that justified Stephens' refusal to obey but
47. 271 Ore. 390, 532 P.2d 788 (1975).
48. Stephens v. Department of State Police, 19 Ore. App. 119, 122, 526 P.2d
1043, 1045 (1974), rev'd 271 Ore. 390, 532 P.2d 788 (1975). See OR. REv. STAT.
§§ 408.210, 408.240(1) (1975).
49. 19 Ore. App. at 121, 526 P.2d at 1044-45.
50. Id. at 127, 526 P.2d at 1047.
51. Id.
52. Stephens v. Department of State Police, 271 Ore. 390, 532 P.2d 788 (1975).
cites the test for insubordination set out in Parrish.53 The court con-
cluded that because Stephens was entitled by state statute to a leave
of absence for military training, "he could not be insubordinate in
taking the leave."5 4  Stephens thus stands for the proposition that a
public employee may not be discharged for exercising his or her
statutory rights and that an employee is under no obligation to find
a means of securing that right other than by disobeying an order. In
the view of the Oregon Supreme Court, the holding in Parrish extends
beyond orders involving violations of constitutional rights of persons
and it includes orders that would deny a person's statutory rights. 55
Logically, it should further encompass orders transgressing properly
issued agency regulations that secure the rights of the public employee
or of a third person.
56
A Proposed Standard
Notwithstanding the unclear import of Belmont, an evaluation of
the competing interests of public employees, public employers, and the
public supports the proposition that employees should be protected
from disciplinary action if they in good faith refuse to obey an order
with the reasonable belief that it is unconstitutional or illegal in that
it abridges rights of the employee or a third party or in some other
manner exceeds the superior's authority.
The Interests of Public Employees
A protective scheme would advance the personal interests of
public employees. For example, a public employee possesses an in-
terest in maintaining a sense of personal integrity. Complying with
some order might affect the employee's self-esteem or reputation among
colleagues or friends. The personal interests also include the desire
to avoid administrative sanctions for disobedience or, in the alterna-
tive, possible legal sanctions, both civil and criminal, for obedience to
an unlawful order. An employee who participates in an unlawful or
unconstitutional act may be subjected to criminal liability. Parrish ar-
gued that participation in conduct violative of other person's constitu-
53. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
54. 271 Ore. at 394, 532 P.2d at 790.
55. Cf. Cormier v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, 206 So. 2d 771 (La. Ct. of App.
1968) (employee discharged for refusal to transfer in accordance with an invalid letter
of demotion held justified in failure to report as ordered).
56. Properly issued agency regulations in this context means those promulgated
within the scope of a valid legislative or executive grant of authority.
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tional rights would have subjected him to criminal penalties under the
Federal Civil Rights ActY Without more, that an employee has acted
under orders is not a defense to criminal liability, 58 and whether acting
upon a reasonable belief regarding the legality of an ordered act is
a defense is unclear.59
A public employee may also risk substantial civil liability. 60 Some
states provide redress against public employees for negligence as well
as for intentional and wrongful acts.61 Under the Civil Rights Act of
1871, a state or local employee acting under color of state law may be
personally liable in tort for deprivation of the constitutional rights of
a third party.6 2  The United States Supreme Court in Wood v. Strick-
land63 held that a public official will be liable for damages under sec-
tion 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 for depriving a citizen of
constitutional rights if the official acted maliciously or knew or should
have known that such a deprivation would result.
The civil liability of federal officers for violation of constitutional
rights does not rest only upon specific statutes but flows as well from
the broad language of the Constitution.64 Accordingly, an employee
given an order that reasonably can be believed to violate the constitu-
tional rights of a third party faces the unpleasant option of risking
personal liability or facing the perhaps more certain disciplinary action
that may follow a refusal to obey. This dilemma is mitigated to some
extent by the fact that federal employees are immune generally from
liability if they have acted "in good faith and with a reasonable belief
in the validity of the [action] and in the necessity for [it] . . .,,5
57. Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 51 Cal. Rptr. 589, 592, 594 (1966).
58. United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 343, n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975).
59. Id. The argument would be that the employee who reasonably believes an
order to be legal and who acts upon that mistaken belief lacks the necessary intent
for culpability, J. HALL, GENERAL PRINcCIPLEs OF CxuMnAL LAw, 302-402 (2d ed.
1960).
60. See generally Vaughn, The Personal Accountability of Public Employees, 25
Am. U.L. REv. 85 (1975).
61. See 2 F. HAR'ER & F. JAms, THE LAw OF TonTs § 29.10 at 1638 (1956).
Professor Davis believes that the liability of state officials exercising discretionary
power usually rests upon the theory that the official acted in excess of his authority.
3 K. DAvis, Armn s-AnvE LAw TREAnSE § 26.05 (1958).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
63. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
64. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
65. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456
F.2d 1339, 1341 (2d Cir.) reo'd 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
A reasonable belief in the unconstitutionality of an order may be-
come the standard for imposing liability. The right to disobey may
give rise to a duty to disobey, regardless of the disciplinary conse-
quences. In this event, an employee has a substantial interest in the
availability of a mechanism that affords protection from disciplinary
action resulting from a good faith refusal based upon reasonable belief.
Other sanctions may be applicable to persons who obey orders
that reasonably may be believed to be illegal or unconstitutional. For
example, professionals, such as lawyers and doctors, could conceivably
be subject to professional disciplinary action for following orders that
they believe to be illegal or unconstitutional. 6 In a government con-
text, some possibility also exists that internal administrative sanctions,
such as dismissal or suspension, may be applied, perhaps by new gov-
ernment agency management or by a new political administration.
The interests of employees, therefore, weigh heavily in favor of recog-
nition of their right to disobey orders that they reasonably and in good
faith believe to be illegal because the orders invade their rights or the
rights of others.
The Interests of Public Employers
Upon first examination, the interests of public employers support
the requirement of unlawfulness in fact. The employer's interests may
be classified generally under the rubrics of efficiency and of harmony
and loyalty. The California appellate court in Belmont stated in a
summary manner that the unrestricted prerogative of an employee to
disobey an order would "disrupt and impair" the public service."7
Because the opinion approves disobedience to an order in fact unlaw-
ful, the argument of the court seems to be that the additional refusals
engendered by the abandonment of the requirement of unlawfulness
in fact might impair or disrupt the service. This reluctance to provide
for a broader standard, as is seen in the result in Belmont, appears
reasonable on first impression because the proposed test based on
reasonable actual belief arguably presents too permissive a standard.
66. To be subject to discipline, an attorney's illegal conduct need not be related
to his professional conduct if his or her offense involves moral turpitude affecting
fitness for the practice of law. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No.
336 (1974). See Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811
(1974). Therefore, an attorney/employee could face disciplinary action for involve-
ment in an illegal activity unrelated to professional duties.
67. Belmont v. California State Personnel Bd., 36 Cal. App. 3d 518, 520, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 607, 609 (1974).
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Efficiency
In some circumstances, particularly those created by an emer-
gency, efficiency interests in immediate implementation of orders may
outweigh other interests.68 Although an argument could be made as
in the military service 9 that the character of the public service requires
unquestioning obedience in the interest of efficiency, the strength of
this argument is doubtful.70  In a democratic society, efficiency is of-
ten sacrificed for other values. The actions and conduct of public
officials are significantly limited and controlled by law.7 ' The values
68. See Roller v. Stoecklein, 75 Abs. 453, 456, 143 N.E.2d 181, 184 (1957).
69. In upholding the articles of the military code against a challenge of uncon-
stitutional vagueness, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, remarked, "The
fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of
discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitu-
tionally impermissible outside it." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).
The Supreme Court has also upheld against challenge for vagueness the standard
for disciplinary action against federal employees, "such cause as will promote the
efficiency of the service." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 158 (1974) (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1970)). Language in two recent Supreme Court decisions dis-
cussing the rights of public employees is strikingly similar to Justice Rehnquist's lan-
guage in Levy. "Nor did any of those cases involve a public agency's relationship
with its own employees which, of course, may justify greater control than over the
citizenry at large." McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv., 424 U.S. 645, 646 n.6 (citing
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)); United States Civil Service
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1976),
upheld hair length requirements for policemen, noting that the method of organization
of the police "gives weight to the overall need for discipline, esprit de corps, and
uniformity" and that there is a "highly significant" difference between the due process
protection provided to the public and to an employee of the police.
70. Clearly, substantial differences exist between public employment and military
service including the character of service, the freedom to pursue other activities, and
the traditional view of public service as another civilian occupation. The Supreme
Court has recognized the unique nature of military service in upholding denial of
educational benefits to persons who, as conscientious objectors, performed alternative
civilian service. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
The Levy decision, moreover, is not inconsistent with the right advocated in this
Article. In Levy, both the military law judge and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized that refusal to obey an order to commit a war crime is a recognized de-
fense to a charge of insubordination. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 797 (3d Cir.
1973). As the court stated, Captain Levy simply "failed to demonstrate how the ex-
istence of war crimes committed by individuals other than those he was ordered to
train was relevant to his failure to obey the order." Id. Thus, the unique character
of military service may support requiring a more rigorous standard in order to justify
disobedience.
71. "With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no
technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under
the law ....
Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court
upon which these legal restraints72 are based are in conflict with the in-
terest in efficiency and cannot effectively be undercut by an efficiency
argument alone.
The government has an additional interest, in fact an overriding
interest - ensuring that governmental power is exercised within proper
bounds. From this perspective the interest of persons exercising gov-
ernmental power diverge from the interests of the government. 73  The
government seeks to bind itself to the law and the Constitution. In
a democratic society the ability of government to govern does not rest
upon governmental power alone but relies as well upon a concept of
governmental authority, a concept grounded in the belief of citizens
that governmental goals and policies are legitimate. Without this
sort of authority, the foundations of democratic government may be
endangered.7 4  From this premise, the conclusion may be drawn that
to be last, not first, to give them up." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (footnote omitted).
"Checks and balances were established in order that this should be a 'govern-
ment of laws and not of men.' The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted
by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of
arbitrary power ...... Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 292-3 (1926) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
72. A recent report by the Corporate Accountability Research Group (CARG)
revealed 897 instances between January 1, 1971, and August 9, 1974, when a federal
court of appeals found that an executive agency of the federal government had acted
unlawfully. B. HALL, A. SCHWARTZ, M. GREEN, WHEN LAW ENFORCERS BECOME
LAw-BREAKERS: A STUDY oF EXECUTIVE BRANCH ILLEGALITY - 1971-1974 at 7 (1976).
The CARG Report includes only cases decided by Federal Courts of Appeals, the
Court of Claims, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The report notes
that a plaintiff who wins at this level must have a very strong case. Id. at 5. The
CARG Report concludes that "given the substantial expense and judicial hurdles to
be overcome when a citizen sues the government of the United States, it is safe
to assume that each case represents hundreds of other illegalities which went either
undetected or unchallenged." Id. at 7.
73. Kenneth Culp Davis has stated: "Uncle Sam - the United States Govern-
ment - is not a single individual, but is partly a Congress which fixes basic policies,
partly administrators who are supposed to carry out congressional policies and who
may abuse their discretion in the process, and partly a system of courts which must
decide whether or not to check the administrative abuses. A court that might properly
refuse to check the old gentleman in stars and stripes, if he were a single human
being, might well check Uncle Sam's agents when they depart from what Uncle Sam
through Congress has directed them to do. A court that checks Uncle Sam's agents
is not limiting Uncle Sam's will but is helping to carry out his will. Indeed, experience
proves that courts are needed to check administrative abuses, [and] that a court of
judges is especially well qualified to do this kind of checking ...... K. DAvis, Discre-
TIONARY JUSTICE 177 (1969) (emphasis in original).
74. "Our government is the potent, the omnipresent, teacher. For good or for
ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the govern-
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the citizenry will be more inclined to possess confidence in a govern-
ment whose employees are more than mere blindly obedient servants.
Government employees exercising independent judgment are more
likely to compel continuing reevaluation of government policies, there-
by contributing to the creation of a climate in which information re-
garding the wisdom of policies may reach and affect policy makers
within government.7 5  Objections to orders reasonably believed to be
unlawful may also serve to attach responsibility more clearly for actions
within a particular agency. When the interest of the government as
an employer in having orders efficiently carried out comes into conflict
with its interest in maintaining its own lawfulness, the latter must
prevail.
Loyalty and Harmony
Apart from efficiency, persuasive arguments have been made that
the government, like other institutions, requires for its continuing via-
ment becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
75. A study of nine federal agencies conducted by Herbert Kaufman of The
Brookings Institute found that the failure to detect widespread patterns of noncom-
pliance within the agencies was not due to a breakdown of administrative feedback
processes but to a lack of incentive on the part of agency leaders. H. KAUFmAN, AD-
muNIsTArmvE FEEDBACK: MONrrOING SurBoR.mATs" BEHvIoR 62 (1973). Rec-
ognition of the right to disobey is consistent with Kaufman's suggestion that leaders
be held responsible for their subordinates. Both are methods of insuring that infor-
mation regarding possible illegal action reaches agency officials and that responsibility
for such orders can be clearly determined. Kaufman's study concludes: "One result
of shortcomings in the feedback process is that discrepancies between the intentions
of leaders and the behavior of subordinates are likely to increase with time because
each such discrepancy tends to engender and exculpate others. With large organiza-
tions playing ever larger roles in modem society, the cumulative impact of impercepti-
ble divergencies of this kind.. . .can shake the foundations of public administrative
structures and democratic principles." Id. at 79.
The right to disobey is consistent with new concepts of managerial behavior that
suggest that public service would benefit from recognition of the right. Anthony
Downs concludes that in bureaus in which loyalty to a single leader becomes a dom-
inant force, the leader will tend to surround herself with second rate subordinates.
A. DowNs, INsmE BuREAucRAcy 71-74 (1967).
Warren Bennis has argued for a new philosophy of managerial behavior based
on collaboration, the concept of power based on collaboration and reason replacing
managerial philosophy based upon power and fear. W. Bzmq-s, BEYOND BUREAUcRACY
188 (1966). Bennis states that democracy in administration "becomes a functional
necessity whenever a social system is competing for survival under conditions of chronic
change." An aristocratic structure cannot adapt rapidly enough to survive. Id. at
19-20.
Vincent Ostrum in discussing the basic propositions of democratic administration
bility the personal loyalty and harmony of its employees. The United
States Supreme Court has recognized the promotion of personal loyalty
and harmony to be a legitimate governmental objective, although one
not sufficiently compelling to contravene constitutional rights such as
the first amendment right to free speech.76
A discussion of three kinds of public employees may be useful -
those who perform only ministerial duties which may include minor
policy-making, and those who work closely with primary decision-
makers or who are "confidential" employees for a different reason.
Ministerial Employees
Justice William Rehnquist has observed that in "situations involv-
ing government employees less close to the final decision-making au-
thority, [those] less responsible for carrying out those decisions, the
government's interest in governing becomes lesser in the scale, and
states: "Perfection in hierarchical organization accountable to a single center of
power will not maximize efficiency as measured by least-cost expended in time, effort,
and resources." V. OsTRurm, THE INTELLECTUAL CRISIS IN AMERIcAN PuBLIc ADMIN-
ISTRATION 112 (rev. ed. 1974) (emphasis in original). Ostrum notes how Watergate
and the constitutional crisis of the 1970's "reflect a central tenet of American scholar-
ship in public administration: unity of command." Id. at 136.
These modern theories of public management suggest that recognition of the
right to disobey, rather than reducing efficiency, would create one of the necessary
foundations for a modern and more efficient public service based on democratic ideals.
Modern management theory clearly supports recognition of the right and rejects un-
supported objections based on vague fears of "disrupting or impairing" the public
service.
76. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570 (1968). In Pickering
the Supreme Court held that the writing and publishing of a public school teacher's
letter sharply critical of the school board was protected by the first amendment. The
school board contended that "the publication of the letter damaged the professional
reputations of the Board and the superintendent and would foment controversy and
conflict among the Board, teachers, administrators, and the residents of the district."
Id. Finding no evidence to support this allegation, the Court stated that the teacher's
employment relationships "with the Board, and to a somewhat lesser extent, with the
superintendent are not the kind of close working relationships for which it can per-
suasively be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper
functioning." Id.
Lower courts have emphasized that the government has a legitimate concern in
promoting personal loyalty when necessary in a close working relationship. See Meehan
v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 312 F.
Supp. 1105, 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), Murphy v. Facendia, 307 F. Supp. 353, 355 (D.
Colo. 1969).
Nevertheless, personality conflicts should not subject the employee to disciplinary
action unless they produce results detrimental or prejudicial to the efficiency of the
public service. Hamlett v. Division of Mental Health, 325 So. 2d 696, 700 (Ct. of
App. 1976).
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the employee's right as a citizen to speak his mind becomes greater."
77
Similarly, although a less responsible employee may be required to
establish a policy to carry out a decision such that he or she is ordered
to act in a ministerial capacity, the employee's distance from the de-
cisionmaking process renders a refusal to obey less likely substantially
to impair the harmony and loyalty interest. If that interest is balanced
against a public employee's right to disobey, the apparent conflict be-
tween them may not be as substantial as might first appear. Disharmony
at this level may be expected to have an impact on co-employees and
the public to a lesser extent than would be the case at the decision-
making level. What disruption there is will affect only the employee
and his or her supervisor. Thus, Justice William Relmquist's observa-
tion that the government's interest in promoting loyalty and harmony
in working relationships decreases as the employee is removed from
final decisionmaking authority seems consistent with recognition of a
right of public employees to refuse to obey orders perceived to be
illegal.
Policy-making and Decisionmaking Employees
For employees who exercise policy-making or decisionmaking au-
thority, the government interest in loyalty and harmony is greater.
Still, conflict with the government interest in loyalty and harmony may
be limited. An objection directed to a superior regarding an order
affecting the employee's job is less likely to disrupt the employment
relationship than external public criticism. Recognition of the right
to disobey may serve to reduce personal animosity created by an em-
ployee's refusal, because arguably a superior is less likely to take per-
sonal umbrage at the employee's conduct.
Even in recognition of the fact that the need for personal loyalty
and harmony will conflict in some cases with the recognition of an
employee's right to disobey in good faith an order reasonably believed
to be illegal, significant govermental interests preponderate in favor
of recognition of the right to disobey. If the Watergate hearings de-
veloped one overriding theme, it was that demanding of government
employees blind and unwavering loyalty and obedience to their su-
periors is not only inappropriate but dangerous. Watergate amply
demonstrated the danger that group pressure or demands of personal
loyalty may overwhelm conscience, duty, and law.78
77. Rehnquist, Public Dissent and the Public Employee, 11 Crvm Smv. J. 7, 10
(1971).
78. See generally FEDERA POLITICAL PERSoNNEL MA uAL., reprinted in Executive
Sess. Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities of the U.S.
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At present, both the law and general principles surrounding civil
service administration recognize that personal loyalty and harmony
must yield under some circumstances to other interests. The Code
of Ethics for Government Service reads in part that "[any person in
government service should: put loyalty to the highest principles and
to country above loyalty to persons, party, or government department
[and] uphold the Constitution, laws and legal regulations of the United
states and of all governments therein and never be a party to their
evasion . . . ."9 Effective government service must be defined in
terms of lawful public service.
8 0
Federal Schedule C Appointees and Cabinet Officials
In contrast to the above discussion are the problems of confiden-
tial government employees. Recognition of the right of these em-
ployees to disobey may give rise to complexities peculiar to their
positions. A brief examination of the application of the right to dis-
obey to these groups supports rather than contradicts the theory here-
in presented, that the government interest in loyalty and harmony
need not be defeated by the right to disobey. An examination of two
categories of federal employees will illustrate this proposition.
Schedule C positions are limited in number and are characterized
by their confidential nature."' They are those positions said to be so
closely tied to policy formulation and policy justification that an ad-
ministration is entitled to have them filled by individuals who share
the perspective of the administration or in whom the administration
has particular confidence. 2  The holder of a Schedule C position may
Senate, Use of the Incumbancy-Responsiveness Program, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Bk. 19
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Responsiveness Hearings]. Robert Hampton, Chairman of
the United States Civil Service Commission testified that during the Nixon administra-
tion there had been "an organized and systematic effort" to undermine the integrity
of the merit system in the Civil Service by persons holding the "misguided view that
the Federal work force could only be made responsive by replacing long-time civil
servants with so-called loyal newcomers." Violations and Abuses of Merit Principles
in Federal Employment: Hearings on H.R. 2162 Before the Subcomm. on Manpower
& Civil Service, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 9 (1975).
79. H.R. Cong. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). Similarly broad standards
of conduct are contained in 5 C.F.R. Part 735 (1976).
80. 0. STAHL, PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION (6th ed. 1971). Stahl quotes
Frank J. McGilly: "In any civilized way of looking at public service, ethics are a
part of competence; if the public is not getting ethical service from its stewards, it
is not getting effective service." Id. (quoting McGILLY, PRIVATE CONSCIENCE AND
PUBLIC SERVICE - REFLECTIONS ON CODES OF ETHICS, HoRmzONs FOR MODERN Gov-
ERNMENTS 18 (1963)).
81. 5 C.F.R. § 213.3301 (1977).
82. Of course, the vast majority of policy-making positions are not included within
[Vol. 29
November 1977] PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND THE RIGHT TO DISOBEY 281
be dismissed solely on the ground that the appropriate administration
official has lost confidence in him or her.
By design Schedule C positions emphasize the governmental in-
terest in loyalty and harmony among high-ranking subordinate officers.
The question of loyalty obligations is nevertheless not entirely clear
even in Schedule C situations. For example, because independent
regulatory agencies have legislative, judicial, and executive powers,
they must be independent of both the executive and legislative
branches. In 1974 the issue of to whom Schedule C appointees owe
their loyalty was raised dramatically. The Civil Service Commission
refused to approve the appointment of individuals to Schedule C po-
sitions in the Consumer Products Safety Commission on the ground
that the appointees were politically unacceptable to the President.
When the Consumer Product Safety Commission asserted its right to
appoint individuals regardless of their political acceptability to the
President, the Civil Service Commission recharacterized the positions
so as to place them outside of Schedule C, thereby removing the
requirement of Presidential approval.
8 3
Even if the loyalty of a Schedule C appointee may legitimately
be required to exceed that of employees who do work as intimately
with superiors, the right to disobey nevertheless need not be completely
rejected. A balancing of the competing interests is desirable. Be-
cause Schedule C positions require by regulation the continuing con-
fidence of the public employer, however, greater weight in this peculiar
circumstance should be given to the governmental interest in loyalty
and harmony. If the interest is given greater weight, there could be
at least three different results: (1) rejection of any right to disobey,
(2) imposition of the requirement that the order actually be found
to be illegal, or (3) modification of the remedy afforded, providing
some recourse short of reinstatement to employees wrongfully dis-
charged . 4  The first option gives absolute weight to the loyalty in-
Schedule C, and some positions included within Schedule C, such as chauffeurs and
secretaries, are not policy-making positions. The effect of classification of positions
as Schedule C is to allow an administration to fill the positions without complying with
civil service examination and appointment requirements.
83. For a record of the exchange, see PRoD. SAuFm-, & Li~a. R P. (BNA) 405
(May 10, 1974), 77 (Feb. 1, 1974), 3 (Jan. 4, 1974).
84. Other methods of responding to the government interest in these peculiar
cases also exist. For example, the right to disobey could be limited by granting the
right only for certain types of wrong orders. The right could be limited only to
orders that directed commission of a crime, of an unconstitutional act, or of violation
of a statute.
terest. The second option gives some weight to loyalty interest but
also protects against abuses of government power in those cases in
which the employee believes that an order illegally infringed on some-
one's rights and the order is in fact illegal.8 5 The third option balances
the interests in a novel fashion by providing compensation but denying
reinstatement. This alternative remedy would furnish some incentive
for disobedience on appropriate occasions but would ensure that the
Schedule C position still serves to embody interests in loyalty and har-
mony because a government official would not be required to continue
to work with a disobedient employee. The peculiar problems raised
by Schedule C positions emphasize the point that loyalty and harmony
are not the principal elements in defining the employment relationship
with regard to most government positions and that if loyalty and har-
mony do predominate, the right to disobey should be modified to meet
that peculiar circumstance.86
The unique constitutional and legal status of cabinet officers, on
the other hand, evidences a basic decision to establish a truly novel
employment relationship between these persons and the President.
The case of Myers v. United Statess7 established the broad outlines of
this employment relationship. In Myers, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether the President, without the advice
and consent of the Senate, could remove a postmaster who had been
confirmed by the Senate. In upholding the authority of the President,
the Court reasoned that the power to remove an existing cabinet officer
is vested in "the governmental authority which has administrative
control."8
Under the Myers decision, a constitutionally protected employ-
ment relationship with the President would preclude judicial recog-
nition of the right to disobey. Previous and subsequent developments
demonstrate, however, that the employment relationship articulated in
Myers is limited to a narrow group of high level officials. Two subse-
85. This option is analogous to the requirement for disobedience to a military
order to commit a war crime - the order in fact must be illegal. See note 70 supra.
86. The burden of establishing that a position is principally defined in terms of
personal loyalty and harmony should rest upon the public employer. Cases of doubt
should be resolved in favor of the employee. When an employee's rights are re-
stricted based upon some government interest relying upon characterization of the
employee's position, the public employer should bear the burden of proof. Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 368 (1976).
87. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
88. Id. at 121.
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quent cases, Humphrey's Executor v. United States 9 and Wiener v.
United States,90 have limited the scope of presidential power to remove
employees. The opinions stress that officials who exercise independ-
ent, quasi-judicial, or legislative functions do not serve at the pleasure
of the President. The relationship between these officials with inde-
pendent grants of authority and the President is not the same as that
between the President and cabinet officers, with whom the President
is measurably more intimately aligned. For noncabinet officials, Con-
gress may specify terms and conditions of employment; 91 therefore,
these positions do not involve a constitutionally protected employment
relationship with the President.
In the federal government a decision has been made that, at least
for top level political officers, trust and confidence define the employ-
ment relationship.92 Any controls that may exist to curb presidential
abuse of the relationship are apparently largely political in nature;
an imprudent President in this regard may be held accountable only
at the ballot box or through the impeachment proceedings. The resig-
nation of Elliot Richardson and the dismissal of William Ruckelshaus
exemplify the profound political costs that may flow from the unjustified
removal of a disobedient official.93
A comparison of Schedule C officials and cabinet officers highlights
those situations wherein the government interest in harmony and
loyalty may override other considerations. At the same time, the fact
that officials in both these categories are different from most public
employees illustrates the soundness of the general postulate that the
governmental interest in harmony and loyalty need not be an impedi-
ment to judicial recognition of the right of public employees to disobey
illegal or unconstitutional orders.
89. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
90. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
91. This power of legislative modification is the basis of the modem civil service.
"The power of Congress thus to limit the President's otherwise plenary control over
appointments and removals is clear." Roth v. Brownell, 215 F.2d 500, 502 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
92. This basic decision in the federal government rests heavily upon the concept
of separation of powers, a concept that is not necessarily applicable under state con-
stitutions.
93. The dismissal of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox gave rise to Richardson's
resignation and Ruckleshaus' firing. Cox was dismissed by Solicitor General Bork,
acting under President Nixon's order. Cox's dismissal was held to be illegal because
his tenure was protected by Department of Justice regulations. Nader v. Bork, 366
F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973).
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Benefits of the Proposed Standard
The two broad standards that would give rise to a right to disobey
- reasonable belief and good faith - do not necessarily deny the
government its legitimate interest in efficiency and in personal loyalty
and harmony. The requirement of reasonable belief is not satisfied
by a mere difference of opinion with regard to a discretionary matter
of judgment. A public employee would be required to have ample
grounds for disobedience, subject to external scrutiny respecting the
potential illegality of the order, before the right to disobey would at-
tach. In Parrish, information known by the plaintiff at the time he
made his decision gave him reasonable grounds to believe the proposed
order was unconstitutional. 94  In order to meet the reasonable belief
requirement in other than simple situations, an employee may have an
affirmative duty to acquire sufficient information to understand and
to evaluate the context in which the order is given. The requirement
of reasonable belief protects the legitimate governmental interests in
efficiency and harmony.9 5
The second requirement of good faith would require more than
the mere assertion of the employee about his or her belief. A court
would review the circumstances surrounding the occasion of the dis-
obedience of the order to determine whether the employee actually,
94. 66 Cal. 2d 260, 276, 425 P.2d 223, 234, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 633 (1967).
95. The requirement of reasonable belief is similar to standards generally ac-
cepted in personnel administration. "Where the morality of a prospective action is
involved, [the public employee] must first of all decide for himself whether it is an
isolated instance or whether it is a part of a total pattern of behavior. He must
also think in terms of the larger good. Is the supervisors different view justifiable
in that light, even though he may continue to think of his own view as preferable
in a more limited context? Is it possible that others will find as much rationality in
the supervisor's judgment as in his own? In short, can he be certain that he is right
and his supervisor wrong? . .. Only when the employee has serious evidence of
willful violation of the law, blatant corruption, or equally obnoxious misdeeds is he
in a position to take his case outside the organization. Differences in point of view
or interpretation are part of the normal grist of the bureaucratic mill. But the other
issues do arise, and the potentiality of facing up to them should be part of every
intelligent civil servant's fund of mental and emotional preparation." 0. STAHL, PtrB-
LIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION 251-52 (6th ed. 1971). Modern public management
theory similarly espouses the right to disobey.
"The public servant in a democratic society is not a neutral and obedient servant
to his master's command. He will refuse to obey unlawful efforts to exploit the com-
mon wealth or to use the coercive capabilities of the state to impair the rights of
persons, but he will use reason and peaceful persuasion in taking such stands. Each
public servant in the American system of democratic administration bears first the
burden of being a citizen in a constitutional republic; and citizenship in a constitu-
tional republic depends upon a willingness to bear the costs for enforcing the rules
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in good faith, believed the order to be illegal at the time or whether
the asserted belief in illegality was retrospective justification.9"
The Interests of the Public
The interests of the public support recognition of the right of an
employee acting in good faith to disobey an order reasonably believed
to be unlawful. Although the public shares the interests of the public
employer in an effective public service on the one hand, the public
also has an exceptionally strong interest in ensuring that government
operates without abuse and within the law. This public interest coin-
cides with that of the government itself As government involvement
in the private sector increases, the need to subject the government to
law increases. The record of the Senate Select Committee on Presi-
dential Campaign Activities suggests many ways in which the power
of the government has been used illicitly to coerce desired political
behavior from private citizens. 97 In light of the substantial risks to
the public resulting from the abuse of governmental power, the public
has a particular interest in judicial acceptance of an obedience stand-
ard that will not only permit but also encourage resistance to illegal
orders.
of constitutional law against those who exercise the prerogatives of government." V.
OsTRum, THE INTELLECTUAL CRISIS IN AuaucAN PuBLc ADMI-NISTRATION 131 (rev.
ed. 1974).
96. The opinions in Roller and Parrish stress that the attempts to resolve the issue
with superiors prior to disobedience is an important consideration in judging an em-
ployee's conduct.
97. Responsiveness Hearings, supra note 78, at 8322 (Malek Exhibit No. 5); Ex-
ecutive Sess. Hearings, supra note 1, at 572-76.
Even in private employment, where an employee may be terminated at will, the
courts have found that the public's interest in obedience to the law is sufficient grounds
to restrict the power of an employer to remove an employee. For example, in Peter-
mann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d
25 (1959), aff'd, 214 Cal. App. 2d 155, 157, 29 Cal. Rptr. 399, 400 (1963), the court
in granting relief to a union business agent who had been fired for refusal to commit
perjury before a legislative committee stated: "To hold that one's continued employ-
ment could be made contingent upon his commission of a felonious act at the instance
of his employer would be to encourage criminal conduct upon the part of both the
employee and employer and serve to contaminate the honest administration of public
affairs." Other cases have limited in the public interest the right of private employers
to terminate employees at will. Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 171 (1960) (dismissal of an employee for undertaking jury service); Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (dismissal of female employee
for refusal to go out with her foreman); Ness v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Ore. 1975)
(dismissal of employee for jury service). See generally, A Common Law Action for
the Abusively Discharged Employee, 25 HAsTINGs L.J. 1435 (1975).
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The essential inducement would result from recognition of a lib-
eral standard - the right to disobey in good faith and upon reason-
able belief notwithstanding an order's actual legality or illegality as
determined later.
Weighing the interests of the public, public employees, and public
employers focuses the arguments for and against the recognition of
the right to disobey. A balancing of the interests strongly supports
the argument that judicial protection from disciplinary action should
be extended to public employees who act in good faith and upon rea-
sonable belief. Recognition of the right would constitute a statement
that, if the required standards are satisfied, the employee has com-
mitted no wrongful act for which discipline is appropriate. The right
to disobey should be viewed as a justification rather than as an excuse.
Effects of Judicial Recognition of a Right to Disobey
Judicial acceptance of the right to disobey could be expected to
raise at least two questions worthy of examination. First, should the
right to disobey be extended to refusals based upon ethical considera-
tions or concerns of conscience when no assertion is made, or can rea-
sonably be made, that the required act is illegal or unconstitutional?
Second, what is the likely effect of the judicial recognition of the right
to disobey unlawful orders?
Possible Extension of the Right
Practically, under the good faith and reasonable belief standard,
a court may seldom confront the question of whether ethical or moral
grounds alone provide a legitimate basis for refusal. In many cases in
which substantial ethical or moral considerations are involved, legal
or constitutional violations are also likely to appear. This conjecture
is supported by the notion that the Constitution embodies broad values
widely shared as ethical values as well. Most cases will probably be
argued with emphasis upon the legal or constitutional infirmities of
an order, rather than upon any concomitant ethical frailties. The ob-
jections of the employees in both the Parrish and Belmont cases appear
As the Watergate hearings suggest, the public's interest in government's adher-
ence to law is extremely strong and the need for judicial protection of that interest
paramount. The cases regarding private employment, where the public interest is
often less substantial and the private interest in freedom from interference greater,
suggest that the courts should be willing to go quite far in protecting the public in-
terest in government adherence to law.
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to have rested heavily upon ethical concerns or general beliefs. On
appeal, however, the employees' objections were more precisely articu-
lated and were couched in terms directing the court's attention to
questions of illegality and unconstitutionality. In Belmont, however,
the employees asserted their ethical obligations to their clients as an
alternative ground in support of their alleged right to disobey, and the
court specifically held that when ethical obligations came into conflict
with employment obligations, the employment obligations prevail.9 8
In most cases, little will be lost by limiting the right to disobey to
grounds supported by claims of illegality, although in some cases such
a limitation might serve to obscure a substantial and perhaps quite
reasonable personal motive for an employee's act. Cases may arise
in which an order that appears clearly lawful or constitutional may be
objectionable to an employee on reasonable ethical grounds. For ex-
ample, a statute might require affirmative conduct by employees that
is apparently valid under existing constitutional standards but that
affects an individual's interest, such as having long hair or wearing
American flags on uniforms. 99 The order might affect the interests
of third parties, such as a requirement that public employees collect
and analyze information concerning private citizens.100 The order
might involve military or diplomatic decisions that are legal but in
which the employee finds participation morally repugnant. 101
An analysis of the interests underlying the recognition of the
right in good faith to disobey an order reasonably believed to be illegal
or unconstitutional suggests that recognition of the right to disobey
should not be extended to such cases. Public employees possess a
strong interest in the judicial recognition of a right to disobey based
on ethical or moral grounds. Important personal rights may be lost or
compromised pursuant to an order. An order that requires an em-
ployee to do that which is morally repugnant is likely to affect the em-
ployee's self-image and psychological well-being. Although the em-
ployee's general reputation may not be affected, his or her reputation
among friends or associates who share similar values may be harmed.
Although the employee's interests supporting the right to disobey
98. 36 Cal. App. 3d 518, 523, 111 Cal. Rptr. 607, 609 (1974).
99. E.g., Slocum v. Fire & Police Comm'n, 8 IMI. App. 3d 465, 290 N.E.2d 28
(1972).
100. E.g., Belmont v. California State Personnel Bd., 36 Cal. App. 3d 518, 111
Cal. Rptr. 607 (1974).
101. For example, an order compelling the reduction of needed food shipments
for some tactical or political purpose.
based upon ethical grounds are arguably less substantial than those
supporting disobedience on legal or constitutional grounds, 10 2 the
interests are worthy of protection.
The interests of the government would appear to demand rejection
of the right to disobey on ethical or moral grounds. The government's
concerns for efficiency and personal loyalty and harmony remain. The
government might be expected to argue in this regard that extension
of the right would expand to an unacceptable degree the universe of
persons protected, thereby increasing the likelihood that the operations
of government might be impaired.
Unlike objections based upon grounds of illegality, objections
based upon ethical and moral grounds arguably do not promote the
government's interest in lawfully restraining its own power. The gov-
ernment's stature in the eyes of its citizens and the world commu-
nity and thereby its effectiveness may decline if its acts are generally
perceived as immoral. The courts, however, should restrict their
intervention to legal or constitutional dilemmas and not interfere.
Therefore, the political process is the appropriate vehicle for resolution
of moral or ethical quandaries.
Another argument against an extension of the right to disobey on
ethical grounds is derived from the observation that the standards
applied to evaluate whether an employee is justified in disobeying an
order perceived to be unlawful are not directly applicable to refusals
based on ethical grounds. A determination as to what constitutes a
reasonable belief that an order is unethical or immoral may be expected
to be a very difficult one. Although reasonable belief is an objective,
external and reasonably discernible standard, there exists a myriad
of ethical systems against which an individual's belief may be evalu-
ated. 10 3 Accordingly, judicial consideration of disobedience premised
102. In most instances, the employee is unlikely to risk criminal, civil, or admin-
istrative sanction by complying with the order.
103. Of course, this argument carries less weight when the employee is appealing
to specific and articulated standards formally accepted by a group. An example
might be professional ethical standards, although doubt exists as to whether those
standards are precise enough to offer an employee guidance.
Proposals have been made to protect professionals who act to vindicate profes-
sional standards. A. BRILOFF, UNACCOUNTABLE AcCOUNTINc 335 (1972) (advocating
a "Nuremberg Code" to which accountants should adhere in spite of superiors' orders
or clients' directives); Note, A Remedy for the Discharge of Professional Employees
Who Refuse to Perform Unethical or Illegal Acts: A Proposal in Aid of Professional
Ethics, 28 VAND. L. REV. 805 (1975) (advocating a right of recovery for professional
employees, such as attorneys and accountants, who are discharged for discussing un-
ethical activity that has occurred or has been solicited or for resisting superior orders
that require unethical activity).
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on individual morality would be difficult for courts ill-equipped to
make such findings.
Minority ethical and moral positions do not receive substantial
support when weighed against the interests of the public. If an order
is lawful and constitutional, the public interest logically demands its
implementation. Disobedience on moral or ethical grounds deserves
protection but not at the expense of impeding what has legitimately
been determined to be a valid government policy. Lawful action, as
in Nazi Germany, may under certain circumstances be characterized
as criminal, in which case individuals of conscience may be compelled
to disobey at any cost. In such political society, however, the pro-
tections herein proposed, or in fact any protections provided by law
or administrative rule, would be unlikely to help. 0 4  Disobedience
based upon conscience or principle, although not entitled to legal pro-
tection, may prove to be effective in altering public opinion and po-
litical attitudes. 0 5 Humane administrative and personnel procedures
might well consider an employee's ethical and moral concerns. 106
Practical Effects of Judicial Recognition
Judicial acceptance of the right to disobey in good faith and upon
reasonable belief may be expected to have a limited, but crucial, effect.
104. L. FuLLER, THE MoaxrA= OF LAw (1964). Fuller's thesis, that law has an
internal morality of rules, questions that a regime, such as Nazi Germany, that did
not believe itself to be bound by legal restrictions is a government operating under
law.
105. E. W ssBAND & T. FRANcx, RFsiNATiON xN PROTEST (1975). Weisband and
Franck examined the resignation of 389 senior officials who resigned between 1900
and 1970 on matters of policy and found that only 34 (8.7%) resigned with public
protest. These cases are analogous to disobedience based upon conscience, since
Weisband and Franck suggest that public protest would violate the "rules of the game"
and endanger the official's future government career. The failure to assert individual
conscience impaired public knowledge and debate and, with the Vietnam War, created
the impression of a monolithic government position that denied dissenters a moderate
point of protest. Objections based on conscience can affect the course of policy.
"An individual is ethically autonomous to the degree that he 'sticks to his guns' about
what he thinks, hears, feels, or knows, even when to do so puts him in conflict with
society's, or his team's, conventional widsom and with such social values as conformity,
loyalty, and institutional effliciency." Id. at 3-4. Accordingly, the "social importance
of ethical autonomy lies not in what is asserted but in the act of asserting." Id. at 4.
106. Consideration might be given to the ethical and moral concerns of employees
in a number of ways. For example, in disciplinary actions an employee's moral or
ethical concerns could be treated as excuses for disobedience and used as factors in
ameliorating disciplinary penalties. In addition, changes in job assignments and
duties could be made to reduce interference with an employee's interest in maintain-
ing personal integrity. Change in duties presently is used to remove an employee
from conflict of interest situations. 5 C.F.R. § 735.107(b)(1),(4) (1977).
This acceptance would yield a modest impact on our institutions be-
cause traditional sanctions, express and otherwise, serve to discourage
exercise of the right, and the scheme of judicial protection that might
be devised predictably will have a narrow scope. On the other hand,
judicial recognition would certainly be a crucial element in altering
the character of public service and in creating structures and standards
that reduce the likelihood of abuse of government power.
Acceptance of the proposed standard by which disobedience might
be justified leaves substantial disincentives for principled employee
action. Because due process does not require a hearing prior to ter-
mination from public employment, 10 7 a public employee may be dis-
missed for a substantial period of time before a thorough review can
be obtained. During this period, the employee may face substantial
financial hardship. Such dislocation would not, except in rare cases,
provide a basis for temporary injunctive relief.108 The employee,
therefore, will bear the costs of any dislocation, many of which may
not be adequately compensated by back pay. In addition, the em-
ployee will bear the not insignificant costs, including attorney's fees,
resulting from prosecution of his or her administrative rights. 10 9 The
time, energy, and psychological pressures created by such a struggle
constitute substantial burdens that must also be borne by the employee.
Many of these costs would not be recoverable even if the employee
eventually prevailed.
Several additional factors would limit the effect of judicial ac-
ceptance of the right to disobey. First, the disciplinary action taken
against an employee may consciously be taken upon some contrived,
independent ground, unrelated to a refusal to obey to which protection
might attach. In the interest of avoiding a confrontation or the em-
barrassment of a court's finding that an order is illegal or unconstitu-
tional, a public employer might literally probe an employee's record
107. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
108. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974).
109. To vindicate the rights of Ernest Fitzgerald, who was removed from his job
as an analyst with the Air Force after testifying before Congress on cost overruns on
the C-5A transport, the American Civil Liberties Union estimated that in pursuing his
administrative appeal and attendant court action, costs of approximately $235,000 had
been incurred. These costs included attorneys' fees, secretarial assistance, discovery
costs, and printing. Hearings on S. 1210 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
94, 95 (1975) (testimony of Florence B. Isbell, Executive Director of the American
Civil Liberties Union of the national capitol area). The United States Civil Service
Commission is not authorized to award attorneys' fees to Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald v.
United States Civil Service Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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in search of an independent basis for disciplinary action. By utilizing
the myriad personnel rules and regulations to which employees are
subject, the agency may be able in a large number of cases to discover
such an independent ground." 0  In these cases the employee faces
the nearly impossible burden of establishing that a separate independ-
ent ground for disciplinary action should be overturned because it was
improperly motivated.
A second limitation arises from the requirement that administra-
tive remedies be exhausted before judicial remedies can be pursued."'
The standard for judicial review of administrative decisions is gen-
erally limited in scope to a review based upon the administrative
record. Depending upon the particular administrative structure in-
volved, this administrative record may not be as thorough as that
which an employee might be able to obtain in an independent judicial
determination.
The standards of review, moreover, are likely to be narrow. His-
torically, courts have provided only minimal review of disciplinary
actions against public employees." 2  The tendency among state courts
is narrowly to review administrative decisions dismissing an employ-
ee." 3 A number of federal courts have adopted a standard of review
requiring reversal either for a failure to comply with proper procedures
or for arbitrary and capricious action." 4 In addition, many courts
insist that the administrative finding be supported only by "substantial
evidence."" 5  A narrow standard of review, of course, limits the role
that the judiciary may play in the application of the good faith and
reasonable belief standards for disobedience in any individual case in
which there has been an administrative finding on those issues.
Informal sanctions and controls available to agency managers
constitute the final and perhaps most significant factor limiting the
110. For example, many agencies by regulation limit lunch hour periods for em-
ployees to thirty minutes. While many employees may routinely violate that rule, the
agency's power to enforce selectively this and similar rules creates the likelihood that
in a fair number of cases the agency may find an independent ground for disciplinary
action.
111. R. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW § 5.4(2) (1976). Excep-
tions, however, exist when administrative relief is impossible or unlikely and the
employee potentially suffers substantial harm. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755,
769 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
112. R. VAUGHN, supra note 111 at § 5.4(1).
113. 2 F. CooPER, STATE ADMINIsTRATIVE LAw 710-11 (1965).
114. Johnson & Stoll, Judicial Review of Federal Employee Dismissals and Other
Adverse Actions, 57 CoRNL.L L. REv. 178, 179-83 (1972).
115. Id. at 183-84.
anticipated effect of judicial acceptance of the right to disobey. A
recent study of a federal law enforcement agency found that informal
group standards, enforced by mechanisms such as social pressure and
ostracism, were more significant in establishing standards of behavior
than official regulation. 116  Agency managers possess a wide array of
nondisciplinary sanctions, including transfers, details, job assignments,
and control of the working atmosphere by which they may punish
those employees who fail to meet the standards established by those
managers. 1 7 The plan of the Nixon White House to control and mani-
pulate the civil service relied heavily upon the use of nondisciplinary
sanctions of this nature. 18 These nondisciplinary sanctions have been
used extensively to penalize legitimate employee concern for agency
conduct1 9 and to punish those employees who utilize administrative
procedures seeking redress from race or sex discrimination.120  The
combination of these unofficial curbs to employee freedom suggests
the rationale of the oft-repeated admonition, "you get along by going
along."'
2'
In light of this pessimistic analysis of the foreseeable effects of
judicial recognition of a right to disobey, acceptance appears to con-
stitute only a gesture. On the contrary, prompt judicial recognition
of a right to disobey is crucial in several respects. Judicial acceptance
116. P. BLAU, BUREAUCRACY IN MODERN SOCIETY 50 (1956).
117. For a description of these informal and non-disciplinary sanctions see R.
VAUGHN, THE SPOILED SYSTEM: A CALL FOR CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 1-27 (1975).
118. "[The civil service system creates many hardships in trying to remove un-
desirable employees from their positions." Responsiveness Hearings, supra note 78,
at 102. One technique outlined was the "traveling salesman" designed for the family
man who did not enjoy traveling. He is assigned to a special evaluation project
because of his special competence. "Along with his promotion and assignment your
expert is given extensive travel orders criss-crossing him across the country to towns
(hopefully with the worst accommodations possible) of a population of 20,000 or
under. Until his wife threatens him with divorce unless he quits, you have him out
of town and out of the way. When he finally asks for relief, you carefully reiterate
the importance of the project and then state that he must continue to obey travel or-
ders or resign. Failure to obey travel orders is grounds for immediate separation."
Id. at 103-04.
119. See generally, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Procedure and Prac-
tice on S. 1210 of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
120. See M. Brewer, Behind the Promises: Equal Employment Opportunity in
the Federal Government at IV-18 through IV-33 (draft ed. 1972).
121. "To preach technique before content . .. is a sterile concept. . . . People
don't co-operate just to co-operate; they co-operate for substantive reasons, to achieve
certain goals, and unless these are comprehended the little manipulations for morale,
team spirit, and such are fruitless." W. WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN 396-97
(1956).
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will provide protection to many competent and courageous employees
who are willing to take substantial risks to protect the public authority
with which they are entrusted. Most importantly, judicial acceptance
of a right to disobey would reaffirm the personal responsibility that
each public employee must in theory exercise. Personal responsibility,
in the sense that one is accountable for one's own acts regardless of
commands, offers a powerful concept for proper legal control of public
administration. 122  Judicial acceptance of the right to disobey may
also be expected to impel agency managers to consider more carefully
the legality of their orders.
Conclusion
The law not only commands; it instructs as well. Judicial stand-
ards articulate what society expects and what it will tolerate. The
courts are powerful and influential voices regarding the role that public
employees must play in the preservation of lawful government.
Bureaucracies are not rigid and static but dynamic. The behavior
of employees is predicated in large measure upon the expectations
created by their environment and the employees' perceptions of the
conduct expected of them. Judicial acceptance of the right to dis-
obey, in recognition of the concept of personal responsibility, can do
much to affect the character of the public service and the tacit assump-
tions upon which it is based.123 Of course, legislative and adminis-
trative implementation is necessary to make the right a meaningful
122. "The task in fashioning a system of democratic administration is how to re-
strict the power of command to a minimum and substitute structures of economic,
political, and judicial control rather than rely upon a single overreaching bureaucracy
to coordinate all human efforts. Such controls should be devised so that public
servants. . . . are exposed to the necessity of taking account of the appropriate cost
calculus, the preferences of their constituents, and the legal constraints of constitu-
tional and public laws that bear upon the organization and conduct of collective en-
terprises. Such controls can sustain viable enterprises capable of substantial efficiency
where public entrepreneurs are oriented toward serving their constituents rather than
becoming political masters." V. OsmTRu, THE INrLr.LEcruAL CmsS IN AmmmCAN
PUBLIC ADMxNIsTnAmoN 129 (rev. ed. 1974).
123. Acceptance of the right to disobey may aid in overcoming the human re-
luctance to challenge institutional authority. The experiments of Stanley Milgram,
a social psychologist at Yale University, illustrate the extreme willingness of adults to
go to almost any lengths on the command of an authority. Milgram concludes that
his experiments reveal "the capacity of man to abandon his humanity, indeed, the
inevitability that he does so, as he merges his unique personality into larger institu-
tional structures." S. MmGRAM, OBEDENCE TO AuTHorT: AN ExPRnumNTAL VIEW
5, 188 (1974).
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one, but the need for additional action in these respects is an argument
for, rather than against, judicial acceptance of the right to disobey.
Additionally, judicial recognition might provide the necessary impetus
for subsequent modification of traditional administrative procedures in
this regard and, initially, would provide the standards to be applied,
the effectiveness of which would certainly be taken into account by
the lawmakers.
Among possible legislative responses that may be necessary to
protect the right to disobey and to implement the concept of per-
sonal responsibility are (1) structural changes in the administration of
the civil service, (2) procedures that require administrative responses
to properly raised concerns about the illegality of orders, and (3) ap-
plication of personal sanctions against officials who harrass or punish
employees who in good faith and upon reasonable belief question the
legality of orders.
Greater independence should be afforded to central civil service
agencies or at least to those agencies exercising a review or regulatory
function. 124  An independent administrative agency with investiga-
tory powers, with a mandate to protect public employees who comply
with appropriate standards regarding disobedience, and with the ability
to sanction officials for abuse of personnel authority would provide an
effective means for protecting the right to disobey. If vested with
broad investigatory powers, such an administrative agency might
ultimately be able to develop more liberal standards for disobedience
as well as administrative mechanisms whereby the legality of orders
might be tested by means other than disobedience.
125
Personal responsibility embodies a fundamental tool for control
of human conduct and behavior and, additionally, offers an important
principle by which large institutions might be limited by law more
effectively than has been the case in recent years. Congress and the
courts have already adopted the concept of personal responsibility by
124. Many countries provide substantial independence to central civil services
agencies regulating career advancement including recruitment, appointment, promo-
tion, transfer and discipline. United Nations, The Central Organs of the Civil Service
in the Developing Countries 30 (Department of Economics and Social Affairs) (1969).
125. For example, under the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act a mechanism is
provided whereby an employee is required to consult higher authority for advice re-
garding the legality of a government decision. TF (Tryckfrihetsforordningen) 2:9.
"[T]o a degree far beyond the generally accepted concepts of modern administra-
tion, a Swedish official is bound to apply statutory law as he alone believes it demands.
If his belief differs from others', his is the one that counts." W. GELLHORN, OMBUDS-
MEN AND OTHERS: CrITZENS' PROTECTORS IN NINE COUN-ahES 197-98 (1966).
[Vol. 29
November 1977] PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND THE BIGHT TO DISOBEY 295
providing penalties for the wrongful acts of public employees. 126 The
courts now have the opportunity to vindicate the concept of personal
responsibility by accepting the right of public employees to disobey
under appropriate circumstances.
126. See generally Vaughn, The Personal Accountability of Public Employees, 25
Am. U.L. REv. 85 (1975); Vaughn, The Sanctions Provision of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act Amendments, 25 Am. U.L. lEv. 7 (1975).

